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Electronic Discovery
by Alex Khoury*
and James R. Williams, Jr."
Cooperation, proportionality, and spoliation were the hot topics in
electronic discovery in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in 2017.1 Multiple courts joined in Chief Justice Roberts'
plea for cooperation in e-Discovery in his 2015 Year End Report on the
Federal Judiciary, 2 with a few even requiring the parties and their
attorneys to read the Report before bringing additional discovery
motions. On the proportionality front, several courts used the
proportionality factors to limit e-Discovery burdens imposed on small
businesses. On the spoliation battlefield, e-Discovery sanctions continue
to punish bad actors, but there has been a decrease in the issuance of the
most severe sanctions.
I. COOPERATION
As anticipated in the 2016 Electronic Discovery Eleventh Circuit
Survey, 3 the courts within the Eleventh Circuit took note of Chief Justice
Roberts' call for cooperation in discovery in his 2015 Year-End Report on
the Federal Judiciary. In UnitedHealthcareof Florida, Inc. v. American
*Partner in the firm of Balch & Bingham LLP, Birmingham, Alabama. Georgia College
& State University (B.S., 1994); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2003).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
"Attorney in the firm of Balch & Bingham LLP, Birmingham, Alabama. Auburn
University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2005); Emory University School of Law (J.D., with
honors, 2008). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Alabama.
1. For an analysis of electronic discovery law during the prior survey period, see K
Alex Khoury, Electronic Discovery, Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 68 MERCER L. REV. 971 (2017).
2. See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
(Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 2015.
3. Alex Khoury, ElectronicDiscovery, Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 67 MERCER L. REV. 859
(2016). At least ten opinions out of Eleventh Circuit courts cited the Chief Justice's Report
in 2017. One court went so far as to order the parties to read the Report before coming back
to court on additional discovery motions. Rosovich v. Geltech Sols., Inc., No. 16-81425-CV,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9637 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2017).
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Renal Associates, LLC,4 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida added some specificity to the concept of discovery
cooperation by establishing guidelines for keyword searching that can
help guide practitioners seeking to embrace the judiciary's call for
cooperation.5
The opinion in UnitedHealthCare of Florida, Inc. details how to use
search terms cooperatively to find responsive documents more effectively
and efficiently.6 Specifically, the court stated that it expected the parties
to: (1) work together to come up with reasonable search terms, (2) run
searches using those terms and sample the results to determine if the
searches are returning "excessive irrelevant hits," and (3) refine the
search terms until they return "relevant documents without including an
excessive number of irrelevant documents." 7 The court "strongly
advise [d]" the parties to refine their search terms pursuant to the order
and threatened to "strictly utilize cost-shifting and attorney's fees and
cost sanctions . .. against any party or attorney in this case who .. . fails
to cooperate in good faith." 8
The use of an iterative, cooperative approach to selecting search terms,
like the one espoused in UnitedHealthcare of Florida, is not a new
concept. The opinion in UnitedHealthcare of Florida is important as
precedent for what constitutes "cooperation"-a term that can be
ambiguous and confusing in an adversarial undertaking like litigation.
II. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
The courts are continuing to show that they are taking the
proportionality factors in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) 9
seriously. Scott v. Eglin Federal Credit Union,'0 a sex discrimination
lawsuit, focused on a third-party subpoena to the plaintiffs current
employer, wherein the defendant sought, among other things, all emails
with or about the plaintiff." The court, citing the new proportionality
Rule 26(b)(1), stated that requiring the small business employer to

4. No. 16-cv-81180, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174454 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2017).

5. See id.
6. See id. The ineffectiveness and inefficiency of using search terms to identify
responsive documents is well documented. Nevertheless, reliance on search terms is wide
spread and not likely to end soon. Thus, case law highlighting effective strategies for
employing search terms is still extremely useful to practitioners.
7. Id. at *8-9.
8. Id. at *16.
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
10. No. 3:16-cv-719-RV-GRJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57034 (N.D. Fla. 2017).
11. Id. at *3.
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search for texts and emails would not be proportional to the needs of the
case in light of the marginal relevance of the evidence. 12 The court
explained that "[w]hile emails and text messages may be fair game for
discovery in most cases, in this case it is difficult to understand how these
types of communications could have anything to do with obtaining posttermination employment information concerning the terms of
employment, length of employment and compensation."1 3
In Digital Assurance Certification, LLC v. Pendolino,14 a trade secret
case, the plaintiff, defendant's former employer, issued a subpoena
seeking electronic records from the defendant's new employer. Alleging
that its former employee had stored trade secret information on the
computers or servers of his new employer, the plaintiff sought very broad
production of electronic data, which defendant testified would cost in
excess of $75,000 just to collect and process.15 The new employer moved
to quash the subpoena, arguing that the true purpose of the subpoena
was to harass its competitor and to gain access to the new employer's
trade secrets. 16 Seeking to avoid the expense imposed by the plaintiffs
subpoena, the new employer offered, as an alternative, to run limited
search terms of its choosing and to search for specific, allegedly17
misappropriated documents using MD5 hash values. Analyzing the
proportionality factors, the court held that the plaintiff could not force a
third-party competitor to expend as much as $100,000 on e-Discovery and
18
give the plaintiff carte blanche to review all of its electronic data.
Critical to the court's proportionality analysis were the facts that the
plaintiff presented no evidence that any of the plaintiffs proprietary
information was actually stolen and no evidence of actual damage as a
result of the alleged misappropriation. 19 The court noted, "[w]hile
proportionality requires that all parties have access to relevant
information, the concept of proportionality exists to prevent one party, in
this case [the plaintiffj, from leveraging [asymmetrical discovery] to
20
obtain a tactical advantage over the Defendants."

12.
13.
14.
2017).
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at *8.
Id.
No 6:17-cv-72-ORL-41TBS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160399 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29,
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

*14-15.
*20-21.
*16.
*30-31.
*29.
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III. SPOLIATION
21

Rule 37(e)
empowers the courts to choose among alternative
remedies in the event a party fails to preserve Electronically Stored
Information (ESI) when a court finds the party acted with intent to
deprive the opposing party of the information. 22 In such an instance, the
court may: "(A) presume the lost information was unfavorable to the
party [failing to preserve]; (B) instruct the jury that it may or must
presume the information was unfavorable to the party; or (C) dismiss the
action or enter a default judgment." 23 In 2017, the courts frequently
imposed the least onerous of these alternatives for bad faith spoliationgiving the jury the facts surrounding the failure to preserve and
instructing the jury that it may, in its discretion, presume the
information was unfavorable.
In Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 24 for example, the
court considered Boeing's deletion of emails and CDs following a dispute
over an agreement to jointly bid on a military contract. Boeing's legal
department instituted a "Firewall Plan" following the termination of the
agreement with Alabama Aircraft Industries (AAI), which would have
called for preservation and delivery of relevant ESI to Boeing's legal
department. Two non-lawyer employees of Boeing (who had complied
with the Firewall Plan themselves) assisted a third Boeing employee in
extracting the relevant emails and other ESI from his computer, but
rather than preserving the information and sending it to the legal
department, the employees deleted the ESI. Further, an in-house
attorney removed two relevant CDs from a sequestered area and later
misplaced them, testifying four years later that he did not recall why he
removed the CDs or where they were. 25
After finding that Boeing had a duty to preserve the relevant
information, the court then found that the data was destroyed or lost
because Boeing failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it and that it
could not be recovered through additional discovery. 26 The court
determined that AAI was prejudiced by Boeing's destruction of the
emails, but did not find prejudice as to the CDs, in part because the CD's
custodian was not heavily involved in the relevant aspects of the dispute,
and also because AAI did not attempt to depose the custodian to

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).
Id. (emphasis added).
319 F.R.D. 730 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 9, 2017).
Id. at 733-34.
Id. at 742-43.
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7
determine what was on the CDs.2 Finally, relying in part on Eleventh

Circuit bad faith spoliation law predating the 2015 amendments, the
court held that Boeing deleted the emails with intent to deprive AAI of
the data for use in the litigation because they were intentionally deleted
28
in violation of the Firewall Plan. The court therefore found that it would

instruct the jury at trial that it may presume that the lost information
was favorable to AAI, and further ordered Boeing to pay AAI's attorney's
29
fees and costs in pursuing the spoliation motion.
Interestingly, at least one court has deferred even the "prejudice" and
"intent to deprive" analyses of Rule 37(e)(1) 30 and (2) to the jury. In EEOC
v. GMRI, Inc., 31 an age discrimination case, GMRI failed to preserve
emails for several of its nationwide restaurant locations, and the emails
were later automatically deleted. Although GMRI argued that it believed
the dispute related to only one location and not the nationwide locations,
the magistrate judge found that GMIRI was on notice of the nationwide
32
nature of the dispute when it failed to preserve the emails. The
magistrate judge, finding authority to rule directly by order rather than
report and recommendation, determined that it could not find as a matter
of law that GMRI acted in bad faith, that the EEOC was prejudiced, or
that the emails were deleted with intent to deprive the EEOC of the
evidence. 33 Instead, the magistrate judge ordered that the jury would be
allowed to consider the evidence and ultimately determine whether
34
GMRI had an intent to deprive.
Courts have been hesitant to sanction negligent failure to preserve
information. 35 In Creative Movement & Dance, Inc. v. Pure Performance,
LLC,36

a trade secret case, the defendants' counsel instructed an

employee to remove from her computer any potential trade secret
information using a reliable IT professional to ensure that the file would
be removed and the records would be maintained. The defendants'
attorney believed that the IT professional would create a "mirror image"
27. Id. at 744-45.
28. Id. at 746.
29. Id. at 747.
30. FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e)(1).
31. No. 15-20561-CIV-LENARD/GOODMAN, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181011 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 1, 2017).
32. Id. at *80.
33. Id. at *83-89.
34. Id. at *89.
35. See, e.g., Jackson v. Haynes & Haynes, No. 2:16-cv-01297-AKK, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 116582 (N.D. Ala. July 26, 2017) (being "negligent and irresponsible in maintaining
the information" is not sufficient to establish intent to deprive).
36. No. 1:16-cv-3285-MHC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184727 (N.D. Ga. July 24, 2017).
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of the computer before he removed the files to preserve them for
litigation; however, the IT professional failed to do so and much of the
information from the laptop was not copied to the laptop image before the
data was deleted from the laptop. 37 The plaintiff sought sanctions,
arguing that the deletion was purposeful and intended to deprive the
information from defendants. 38 The court disagreed, refused to impose
sanctions, and found that the defendants had not acted with intent to
deprive the plaintiff of the information, and had instead directed the
third-party IT specialist to preserve the information correctly. 39 The IT
professional's failure to do so was negligent and could not be imputed to
the defendants or the attorney, who believed the IT professional would
be able to competently preserve the data. 40
Although courts have been willing to infer prejudice where the alleged
spoliator intentionally destroyed documents (because only the destroying
party has knowledge of the identity of the documents), at least one recent
case has demonstrated that such inferences are not limitless.41 In HCC
InsuranceHoldings, Inc. v. Flowers,42 the plaintiff argued the defendant,
a former employee, "could have utilized several methods to transfer
HCC's trade secrets" to her personal computer. 43 After initiation of the
lawsuit, notice to preserve the data on her personal laptop and electronic
storage devices, and an order by the court to submit the laptop to a
neutral forensic examiner, the defendant's husband (an IT professional)
ran several programs to clean the computer that could have permanently
deleted files. 44 The plaintiff therefore sought an adverse inference
instruction. 45 The court refused to grant any relief. 46 Although the court

stated that the defendant's and husband's actions were "troubling, and
in breach of her duty to preserve," the court refused to sanction the
defendant for her conduct because, despite extensive discoveryincluding depositions and examination of multiple devices and email
accounts by a forensic examiner-the plaintiff could only offer "bare
speculation" that any trade secrets or other data belonging to the plaintiff

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
LEXIS
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at *2526.
Id. at *29.
Id. at *40.
Id. at *38-39.
See HCC Ins. Holding, Inc. v. Flowers, No. 1:15-cv-3262-WSD, 2017 U.S. Dist.
12120 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2017).
No. 1:15-cv-3262-WSD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12120 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2017)
Id. at *13.
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *12.
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were ever transferred onto the laptop. 47 Clearly, a party alleging
spoliation must offer at least some proof that relevant data was actually
destroyed before a court will infer prejudice.
Finally, despite the general trend toward imposing less severe
sanctions in most garden-variety cases, 48 it is clear that courts will
impose significant sanctions where the wrongdoing is clear and the
prejudice is manifest. For example, the former employee in the Fair
Labor Standards Act case Morrison v. Veale, 49 who argued that her time
cards underrepresented her hours worked, repeatedly logged into the
office Gmail account to delete emails en masse after her termination.
Although the former employee admitted logging into the account to delete
emails shortly after her termination, she claimed to have printed
relevant emails and placed them in folders. She denied logging into the
account thereafter, even though the evidence established that someone
using her cell phone accessed the account a year later (after the lawsuit
was filed) and deleted more emails.50 The court, noting that only the
plaintiff would have known about what was in the deleted emails, found
that the plaintiff had destroyed the emails in bad faith.5 1 As a sanction,
it found that the fact-finder would be required to accept time cards
submitted by the plaintiff as true, and the plaintiff could introduce no
evidence rebutting the time cards. 52
IV. CONCLUSION

The main themes in e-Discovery law in 2017 were no surprise.
Cooperation, proportionality, and spoliation were the hot button topics
that spurred the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and those issues continue to form the battlefields upon which
most e-Discovery battles are fought. As the body of e-Discovery case law
in the Eleventh Circuit increases in 2018, expect the e-Discovery rules of
engagement to continue to clarify.

47. Id. at* 12-13.
48. See also Storey v. Effingham Cty., No. 415-149, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93147 (S.D.
Ga. June 16, 2017) (instructing the jury regarding the fact that video evidence was
destroyed, which allowed the jury to consider circumstances surrounding the destruction,
and precluded any evidence that video supported the defendants' version of events).
49. No. 3:14-cv-1020-TFM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10196 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2017).
50. Id. at *3.
51. Id. at *22.
52. Id. at *25-26.
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